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1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine the informational performance of a simple market where
a number of rms have entered a market whose viability is initially uncertain. In a
good market, all rms make a positive prot whereas in a bad market, all rms make
a loss. The only decision that the rms take in this model is whether to stay in the
market or exit. The rms observe new information as long as they are active in the
market. In addition to their direct observations about the state of the market, they
observe the behavior of the other rms. Each decision by a currently active rm in
the market creates an informational externality. By exiting, a rm delivers bad news
to the other rms. Staying in the market, on the other hand, is good news to the
other rms. We assume that exit is irreversible in the sense that once a rm exits
the market, it is not possible to re-enter. This informational structure is in line with
the recent literature on observational learning models, where agents infer each others
information from the actions taken by others.
The informational model that we adopt is quite simple. We model the game as
an innite horizon game of timing where each rm has to decide on the policy to
exit the market. When the market is good, each rm gets a customer according to
a ow rate . The arrivals of customers are assumed to be independent across the
rms (conditional on the state of the market). If the market is bad, then no rm ever
observes a customer. Not seeing customers is then bad news to each rm and other
things equal, would lead to a more pessimistic belief about the state of the market
and eventually to a decision to exit.
We show that the equilibria of this model involve mixed strategies where su¢ -
ciently pessimistic rms exit the market at a positive rate. Not seeing the other rms
exit is then good news to an individual rm that is still uncertain about the state of
the market. In equilibrium, the negative news from not seeing customers is balanced
with the good news from not seeing exits. At the moment of exit by one of the rms
in the market, the posterior beliefs of the remaining rms about the market state
jump down. If the equilibrium payo¤s of all the rms were strictly increasing in the
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probability of being in a good market, this would lead all the remaining rms to exit
immediately. This is nevertheless not consistent with equilibrium because rms that
have seen a customer in the past would never leave and hence an individual rm
would get an extremely informative signal by waiting just a bit longer.
Our main result is that in the sense of long-run e¢ cient allocation of rms to
the market, the market aggregates information e¢ ciently in the limit as the number
of rms gets large. By this we mean that in markets with many rms, almost all
rms stay in a good market and all rms exit eventually from a bad market in all
equilibria of the game. This is in contrast to the previous literature on observational
learning including the herding models discussed below. At the same time the sum
of payo¤s to the rms is well below the e¢ cient level. We show that the payo¤s
in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model provide a lower bound for the
Nash equilibrium payo¤s in the game. We also show that the unique (asymmetric)
pure strategy equilibrium of the game provides the players the highest sum of payo¤s
within the class of Nash equilibria.
In the symmetric equilibrium of the game, the exit of a rm triggers an immediate
randomization by the remaining rms. If no other rm leaves, play resumes according
to the symmetric equilibrium play of the model with one fewer rm and where no exits
have been observed. If other rms exit, there is need for an additional randomization
by the remaining rms and there is a possibility that the market collapses in the sense
that most or all of the remaining rms exit.
In obtaining the limiting results for the case where the number of rms grows large,
a key role is played by the relative probabilities of market collapse and returning to
the equilibrium path of a model with fewer rms. We show that when the state of the
market is good, the probability of a market collapse goes to zero when the number of
rms in the market grows. It is clear that a bad market must eventually collapse.
We have made the somewhat unrealistic assumption that the protability of the
market is not a¤ected by the number of active rms. The reason for this assumption is
to maintain comparability with other models of observational learning where the only
strategic e¤ect between the players is through the informational externality. We have
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veried that the qualitative features of our model remain valid in a model where the
probability of receiving a customer in any period depends negatively on the number of
active rms as long as a good market is protable even in the case that no rms exit.
If this is not the case, then the analysis is complicated by considerations reminiscent
of war of attrition.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The literature on herding and
observational learning has concentrated on the situation where the information is
held by the agents at the beginning of the game. Many of the models also assume an
exogenously given order of moves for the players. If we adopted these assumptions
in our current model, we would get a result similar to the conclusions in e.g. the
model of herding by Banerjee (1992). By relaxing these assumptions in a direction
that we see as being quite natural, we see that the results also change considerably.
Within this strand of literature, the most closely related paper to ours is Chamley
& Gale (1994).1 In that paper a number of rms are contemplating entry into an
industry. Each rm has private information about the protability of the market and
the resulting game is a waiting game that mirrors our setting. The main result of
Chamley and Gale shows that as actions can be taken at arbitrarily short intervals,
the symmetric equilibrium of the game exhibits herding with positive probability. The
key di¤erence to our model is that in Chamley and Gale, no additional information
arrives and this leads to very di¤erent conclusions in the end. Other papers that have
studied the e¤ects of endogenous timing on observational learning models include
Caplin & Leahy (1994) and Gul & Lundholm (1995). Our model is quite close to
Caplin & Leahy (1994) in its motivation, but as that paper assumes a continuum of
rms in the market, the analytics of the model are quite di¤erent. For example, at
the rst instant of public information revelation all uncertainty is resolved in their
model. In our model, information is revealed gradually over time even in the limit
where the number of rms goes to innity. In Gul & Lundholm (1995), the main
emphasis is on determining whether better informed agents move rst.
The second strand of literature that is directly relevant to our paper is the liter-
1An early contribution along these lines is also Mariotti (1992).
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ature on strategic experimentation. We have borrowed the analytical model from a
recent paper Keller, Rady & Cripps (2005).2 Their model explores the Markov per-
fect equilibria of a model where all the observations by all of the agents are publicly
observable. As a result, the motivation as well as the analysis of the two models turns
out to be quite di¤erent in the end. Our model also di¤ers from that in Keller et al.
in that we assume exit to be irreversible. The reason for this assumption is that in
a continuous time model with reversible entry and exit, the rms would nd it easy
to communicate to each other their observations through an exit followed by quick
re-entry. In order to respect our assumption of imperfect observability, we assume
exit decisions to be irreversible.3 Finally, Moscarini & Squintani (2004) introduce
privately held prior beliefs into a model of R&D race where the success of opponents
is publicly observed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the discrete time model.
Section 3 provides the analysis of the symmetric and asymmetric equilibria of the
model. In section 4, we prove our main theorem that in all equilibria of the exit
game, almost all rms stay in the market if and only if the market is good when the
number of rms is large and the time interval between periods is small. In Section
5, we compute the symmetric equilibrium explicitly in the limiting continuous time
version of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2Another example of stopping games with publicly observed randomness is Décamps & Mariotti
(2004).
3At a late stage in writing this paper, we became aware of a paper by Rosenberg, Solan & Vieille
(2005) that analyzes games similar to ours. Their informational assumptions on signals that are
observed at each stage are di¤erent from ours (they have a continuum of signals and as a result,
they can concentrate on pure strategy equilibria). Furthermore, they do not analyze the case where
the time interval between periods is small and as a result both the analysis and the results in the
two papers are quite di¤erent. An earlier paper on multi-armed bandits and observational learning
is Aoyagi (1998).
4
2 Model
In this section we present the model in discrete time. Time periods are denoted by
t = 0; 1; :::;1. We denote by a constant t > 0 the time interval between any two
consecutive periods t and t+ 1. The discount factor between two periods is
 =
1
1 + rt
;
where r is the discount rate. Since it is not our purpose to analyze the e¤ect of
observation lags, we are ultimately interested in a limit where the rms can react to
the observed actions instantaneously, which we obtain by letting t! 0.
At the beginning of the game, N risk neutral rms have entered the market whose
true protability is uncertain.4 We assume for simplicity that the market is either
good or bad and use notation M = g and M = b to refer to these two possibilities.
Dene Pg ()  P ( jM = g ) and Pb ()  P ( jM = b) to refer to probabilities of
various events conditional on market being good and bad, respectively.
Initially all rms are equally optimistic about the state of the market. Denote
the common prior probability that the market is good by p0. If the market is good,
a customer arrives at a rm at a constant probability  t within each period. The
value of each customer to the rm is v: If the market is bad, no customer will ever
arrive. This means that as soon as a rm observes a customer for the rst time, it
becomes evident for this rm that the market is good. We say that a rm is informed
if it has seen a customer, otherwise a rm is uninformed. The state of the market
is the same for all rms, i.e. we have a setting with symmetric payo¤s and common
values. Conditional on the market state, the arrivals of customers at di¤erent rms
are independent.
At the beginning of each period, a rm that is still active in the market has
a binary decision to make: either stay in the market or leave. Leaving is costless
but irreversible. Once the rm has exited, it will never again face any costs or
4It makes no di¤erence to the model that follows whether the rms have entered subject to a
zero prot condition or not.
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revenues. If the rm stays, it pays the per period (opportunity) cost c t, observes
a signal indicating either an arrival or no arrival of a customer, and moves to the
next period. We assume that c < v, which means that an informed rm will never
want to exit the market, no matter what the other rms do. Within each period the
rms act simultaneously, but they know each others actions at all previous periods.
However, they do not observe the arrivals of customers at other rms, and thus they
do not know whether the other rms are informed or uninformed.5 Note that new
information arrives to the rms through two channels: their own market experience
and observations on other rmsbehavior. In the terminology of learning models,
each rm engages simultaneously in experimentation and observational learning.
The history of rm i consists of the private history recording its own market
experience (i.e. the arrivals of its customers), and the public history recording the
actions of all the rms. However, since observing a customer reveals fully that the
market is good, the only thing that matters in rmsown market experience is whether
or not they have seen at least one customer. As it is always a strictly dominant
strategy for any rm who has observed at least one customer to stay in the market
forever, we simplify the analysis by postulating that any rm that has seen a customer
always stays in the market. This has no e¤ect on any results, but it allows us to restrict
our analysis on the uninformed rms only. For those rms, the only relevant history
is the public history, which we from here on call simply the history. We denote the
history at period t by ht and dene it recursively as follows:
h0 = ; ;
ht = ht 1 [ at 1 8t 2 f1; 2; :::g ;
where at = (at1; :::; a
t
N) is a vector where each a
t
i 2 f0; 1g denotes an indicator for i
staying in the market at period t. Denote by H t the set of all possible histories up to
5Since exit is irreversible, we do not need to worry about the information of those rms that have
already left the market. Hence, when we refer to informed and uninformed rms, we only mean
those rms that are still active.
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t and let H =
1[
t=0
H t. Since exit is irreversible, ati = 0 implies that a
t0
i = 0 for all t
0 > t
in all elements of H t. Denote by Hi 

ht 2 H at0i = 08t0 < t	 the set of histories,
in which i has not yet left the market. Denote by A (ht)  fi 2 f1; :::; Ng jht 2 Hig
the set of rms that remain in the market at the beginning of period t after history
ht and by n (ht) the number of such rms.
A strategy for an uninformed rm i is a mapping
i : Hi ! [0; 1]
that maps all histories where i is still active to a probability of exiting the market.
The strategy prole is  = f1; :::; Ng.
As the game proceeds, the rms update their beliefs on the state of the market
on the basis of their own market experience and on the exit behavior of the other
rms. Given a history ht and a strategy prole , consider a rm i that has not yet
observed a customer. Then is assessment for the probability that the market is good
is dened by Bayesrule. We denote this belief of an uninformed rm by pi (ht;).6
Note that di¤erent uninformed rms may have di¤erent beliefs after the same public
history, because their strategies may be di¤erent and thus reveal di¤erent information
to each other.
Note also that there are histories that are inconsistent with some strategy proles,
making Bayesrule inapplicable. In particular, assume that at history ht some rm j
exits in period t even if this should not happen with a positive probability according
to . Then we simply assume that all remaining rms update their beliefs to a
level that would prevail if rm j did not exist in the rst place, and then continue
the subgame with one less rm present leaving rm j out in all subsequent belief
updates. This arbitrary assumption concerning o¤-equilibrium beliefs has no e¤ect
on any results, but ensures that all equilibria that we will consider are Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibria.
The payo¤ of a rm is the expected discounted sum of future cash ows as esti-
mated by each rm on the basis of its own market experience, observations of other
6For an informed rm the probability assessment that the market is good is trivially equal to 1.
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rmsbehavior, and initial prior probability p0. Denote by Vi (ht;) the payo¤ of an
uninformed rm i after history ht and with prole . An informed rm will stay for
ever, and its payo¤ is easy to calculate:
V + =
(v   c)t
1  1
1+rt
=
(1 + rt) (v   c)
r
:
In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze the equilibria of the model formally. A reader who
wants to get an intuitive characterization rst may want to go directly to Section 5.
3 Equilibrium
As a useful starting point, consider a monopoly rm that can only learn from its
own market experiments. This rm faces an optimal stopping problem, where at the
beginning of each period it must decide whether to stay for at least one more period or
to exit permanently. Denote by p the current probability assessment that the market
is good held by a monopoly rm, who is still in the market at the beginning of an
arbitrary period, but has not seen a customer yet. If the rm stays one more period
of length t in the market, but still receives no customer, then the new value p+p
is obtained by Bayesrule:
p+p =
p (1  t)
p (1  t) + 1  p =
p (1  t)
1  pt =
1  t
1
p
  t : (1)
Consider next the monopoly value function Vm (p). If the rm exits, there is
nothing more to receive or pay, and the stopping value must be 0. On the other
hand, if the rm stays, it receives a customer at probability pt in which case p
jumps to 1 and the rms value jumps to Vm (1) = V + =
(1+rt)(v c)
r
. If there is no
customer, p falls to p+p. The Bellman function can thus be written as:
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Vm (p) = max
24 0 ; ct+ pvt+ 1
1 + rt
n
pt

(1 + rt) (v   c)
r

(2)
+(1  pt)Vm
 
1  t
1
p
  t
! o 35 :
It is well known that the solution to this type of a sopping problem can be written
as a threshold level p such that it is optimal to stop when p < p, while it is optimal
to stay otherwise. Under the assumptions of the model, it must be that 0 < p < 1.
Further, Vm (p) must be strictly increasing and convex when p > p, while it must be
pasted to stopping value 0 at p = p. We will see that the monopoly threshold p has
a crucial role also in the model with many rms. Denote t = min ft jptm < pg.
Let us now consider the model with N rms. We will consider symmetric and
asymmetric equilibria separately, but before that we state a result valid in all equi-
libria. Since the model has no payo¤ externalities, it is easy to see that a rm can
always guarantee at least the payo¤ of a monopoly rm in equilibrium, from which it
follows immediately that no rm wants to exit earlier than a monopoly rm would.
Proposition 1 below states this, but shows also that there can not be an equilibrium,
where all rms would get a higher payo¤ than a monopoly rm.
Proposition 1 Let  be an equilibrium prole. After any ht, it must be that Vi (ht;) 
Vm (pi (h
t;)) for all i 2 A (ht) and Vi (ht;) = Vm (pi (ht;)) for some i 2 A (ht).
Further, whenever pi (ht; ) > p, it must be that i (ht) = 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Since pi (ht; ) > p for all t < t, we have:
Corollary 1 In any equilibrium, all rms stay with probability one at all periods
t < t.
This means that there can never be any information sharing before time t, because
the rms reveal information only via their exit behavior.
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3.1 Symmetric equilibrium
In this section we consider equilibria in symmetric strategy proles. A prole  is
symmetric if i (ht) = j (ht) for all i and j and for all ht. When  is symmetric,
all uninformed rms update their beliefs in the same way, and hence they all share
a common probability p (ht;) that the state of the market is g. When analyzing
symmetric equilibria, we may simply use p 2 (0; 1) to denote this common belief.
Note that all uninformed rms have also the same (expected) payo¤ in the sym-
metric equilibrium. It follows from Proposition 1 that this common payo¤ must be
the same as that of a monopoly rm. Hence, after an arbitrary history ht, any rm
would be just as well o¤ if it decided to ignore all observations of the other rms from
time t onwards. This means that in a symmetric equilibrium no rm is able to benet
from the information that the rms reveal to each other. This observation facilitates
the analysis of the symmetric equilibrium.
We next model the information that the rms extract from each other when they
use arbitrary symmetric strategies. Consider some arbitrary period when n rms
remain in the market and play a strategy according to which they exit at probability
 2 [0; 1] if uninformed. The probability that an arbitrary rm has observed a
customer conditional that the market is good is crucial in determining the amount of
information that can be extracted by observing the other rmsactions. Throughout
the paper we use letter q to denote this probability. In period t, this conditional
probability is qt  1   (1  t)t and q without a superscript denotes an arbitrary
value for this probability without referring to the calender time. Use q  = 1   q
as a shorthand for the complement, that is, the probability that an arbitrary rm is
uninformed conditional on the market being good.
Using the denitions above, we may denote by X (; n; q) the number of rms
that exit in the period under consideration. This random variable has the following
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conditional distributions:
Pg (X (; n; q) = k) =
0@ n
k
1A q k  1  q n k ;
Pb (X (; n; q) = k) =
0@ n
k
1A k (1  )n k :
As a rst step, consider an individual rm with belief p, who observes the behavior
of the n rms. This rm attaches the following unconditional distribution to this
random variable:
P (X (; n; q) = k) = pPg (X (; n; q) = k) + (1  p)Pb (X (; n; q) = k)
=
0@ n
k
1A k hp  q k  1  q n k + (1  p) (1  )n ki :(3)
Given that k rms exit, the belief of the outside observer jumps to a new value
given by:
p+p =
pPg (X (; n; q) = k)
pPg (X (; n; q) = k) + (1  p)Pb (X (; n; q) = k)
=
p (q )k (1  q )n k
p (q )k (1  q )n k + (1  p) (1  )n k : (4)
Obviously, the greater the number of rms that exit, the lower the new belief of
the observer.
To derive a symmetric equilibrium, we use the fact that whenever all rms apply
mixed strategies, they must be indi¤erent between exiting and staying. In the follow-
ing lemma we establish the conditions under which a unique probability  (n; p; q)
exists such that if n   1 rms exit according to this probability, then this provides
the "n:th" rm just enough information to keep him indi¤erent between exiting and
staying:
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Lemma 1 Consider the optimal decision of an individual rm with belief p, who
may either exit the market now or stay one more period to observe the behavior of
n   1 2 f1; 2; :::g rms, each of whom exits with probability  if uninformed, and
with probability 0 if informed. Let q 2 (0; 1) be the probability that each individual
rm is informed given that the market is good. Then there is a lower threshold belief
p (n; q) 2 (0; p) such that:
1. If p  p (n; q), then it is optimal to exit irrespective of 
2. If p  p, then it is optimal to stay irrespective of 
3. If p 2  p (n; q) ; p, then there is a unique  (n; p; q) 2 (0; 1) such that when
 =  (n; p; q), the rm is indi¤erent between staying and exiting. When  <
 (n; p; q), it is optimal to exit while if  >  (n; p; q), it is optimal to stay.
Furthermore, if X (; n  1; q) = 0; then p+p > p:
Function p (n; q) is continuous in q and decreasing in both n and q. Function
 (n; p; q) is continuous in p and q and decreasing in n, p, and q.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric
equilibrium, and utilizes Lemma 1 to characterize it:
Proposition 2 The exit game has a unique symmetric equilibrium. The strategy
prole S =

S1 ; :::; 
S
N
	
in this symmetric equilibrium can be dened recursively as
follows:
For initial histories h0 2 H0:
Si
 
h0i

=
8<: 0 , if p0  p1 , if p0 < p ; i = 1; :::; N :
For histories ht 2 H t extending to period t 2 f1; 2; :::g:
Si
 
ht

=
8>><>>:
0 , if pt  p
 (nt; pt; qt) , if p (nt; qt) < pt < p
1 , if pt  p (nt; qt)
; i 2 A  ht ;
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where nt = n (ht), qt = 1   (1  t)t, and pt is the common belief of all unin-
formed rms induced by ht 1 and S
 
ht
0
, t0 < t, according to Bayesian rule.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The symmetric equilibrium path can be verbally described as follows. In the
beginning, given that p0 is above the monopoly exit threshold p, all rms stay in
the market at probability one. The rms continue to experiment in this manner
until t = t where the beliefs of the uninformed rms fall below p. At this point
they start to randomize. All rms exit with probability  (nt; pt; qt) that keeps them
indi¤erent between exiting and continuing. In each period, the remaining uninformed
rms update their current beliefs after observing the number of exits. If no rm
exits in t = t, then according to Lemma 1 the belief of each uninformed rm jumps
strictly above p. Following this jump, all rms stay in the market with probability
one until p falls back below p at which point the randomization starts over again.
This is continued until all rms have either observed a customer or left the market.
If at some point the belief of the uniformed rms falls below p (nt; qt), the market
collapses as all remaining uninformed rms exit. In such a case, the uninformed rms
are so pessimistic that they do not have enough information to release in order to
keep each other indi¤erent between staying and exiting. Note that if the market is
bad, all rms must eventually exit.
When t shrinks to zero, the equilibrium path can be described more explicitly.
We will do that in Section 5.
3.2 Asymmetric Equilibria
The exit game has a number of asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric one
discussed above. For example, there is an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies
that Pareto dominates the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. This equilibrium
is interesting, because it gives the rms a particularly high total payo¤.
In the pure strategy equilibrium the rms exit sequentially in a pre-determined
order. At every period, each uninformed rm exits either at probability zero or at
13
probability one. Since no rm ever exits if informed, a rm that exits at probability
one conditional on being uninformed reveals fully its payo¤ relevant private history to
the other rms. As soon as such a rm stays, all rms at later positions in the "exit
sequence" learn that this rm has observed a customer, and consequently no rm will
ever exit after that. The equilibrium is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The exit game has a unique (up to a permutation of the players)
equilibrium in pure strategies that Pareto dominates the symmetric equilibrium. In
this equilibrium, no rm exits at periods t < t, but at all periods t  t, kt > 0
rms exit at probability one (if uninformed) until either i) all rms have exited, or
ii) at some period t0  t some rm that was supposed to exit stays, in which case all
the remaining rms stay ever after. There is a unique sequence fktgTt=t of positive
integers for which
TX
t=t
kt = N such that this behavior constitutes an equilibrium.
Proof. In the Appendix.
To dene an equilibrium, the sequence fktgTt=t must be such that on the one
hand all kt uninformed rms that exit at period t are better o¤ by doing so than
by staying and observing the behavior of kt   1 rms, and on the other hand, all
uninformed rms that stay must be better o¤ by observing the behavior of kt rms
than by exiting. This condition is formalized in the proof of Proposition 3.
When the periods are short enough, the rms reveal their information in the pure
strategy equilibrium sequentially one rm at a time:
Proposition 4 There is an  > 0 such that if t < , then at most one rm exits in
each period in the pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. In the Appendix.
We conclude this section by proving that the pure strategy equilibrium delivers
the maximal Nash equilibrium payo¤ to the players in the exit game. Taken together
with the lower bound derived in the previous subsection for the symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium, we have obtained a partial characterization for the equilibrium
payo¤ set of the game.
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Proposition 5 The pure strategy equilibrium maximizes the sum of payo¤s in the
set of Nash equilibrium payo¤s.
Proof. In the Appendix.
It is also worth pointing out that as N ! 1 and t ! 0; the average expected
continuation payo¤ of uninformed agents at date t approaches the rst best optimal
payo¤ of v c
r
:
4 Large Markets
In this section, we analyze the equilibria of the exit game as the number of rms gets
large. We are interested in the case where rms can react to the observed actions
of the competitors quickly and therefore we consider the double limit of the market
where t! 0 rst and then N !1:
The main result in this section and perhaps the main result of the entire paper is
that in large markets, the long run equilibrium outcome is e¢ cient with a probability
converging to unity. To make this statement precise, we calculate the total number
of exits in the market when the time interval between periods is t and the total
number of rms in the market is N . Denote this random variable by X (t; N) : Our
main theorem shows that for all " > 0;
lim
N!1;t!0
Pg

X (t; N)
N
< "

= 1
and
lim
N!1;t!0
Pb

X (t; N)
N
= 1

= 1:
Hence almost all rms stay when the market is good, but all rms exit when the
market is bad. The second statement follows immediately from the arguments in the
previous section and therefore we concentrate on the rst assertion in this section.
It is clear from the previous analysis that the result cannot hold for a nite N . It
is not hard to see that the result also fails in the case where t is large. For large
t; the cost of staying in the market for an additional period is not small and hence
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for su¢ ciently pessimistic beliefs, it is a dominant strategy for the rms to exit. It
is then easy to see that in e.g. the symmetric equilibrium outlined above, there is anbN <1 such that if at least bN rms exit, then the remaining rms exit as well. As a
result, all rms exit the market with a positive (but quite possibly small) probability
even when the market is good.
Theorem 1 In all equilibria of the exit game, for all " > 0;
lim
N!1;t!0
Pg

X (t; N)
N
< "

= 1:
Proof. In the Appendix.
The idea of the proof is that in a large market with no delays between observations
and actions, it is very unlikely that a large number of rms exit, and at the same
time their posterior beliefs remain so low that their decisions to exit are consistent
with equilibrium behavior.
5 Computing the Equilibrium in Continuous Time
In this section, we compute the symmetric equilibrium in continuous time. We have
two reasons for doing that. First, we want to illustrate the properties of the model
in a notationally simpler and hopefully more transparent environment. Second, since
the period length in discrete time may be interpreted as a delay between observations
and reactions, it is natural to analyze the model as t ! 0 to eliminate any e¤ects
such observation lags might have on the results.
To build intuition, we use simple reasoning to derive the properties of the equi-
librium from the rst principles. We work directly in continuous time, but it is easy
to check rigorously that where we end up is nothing but the equilibrium given in
Proposition 2 as t! 0.
In continuous time the rms discount future at ow rate r > 0, pay the ow
opportunity cost c > 0, and meet customers at a Poisson rate  (assuming the market
is good; in a bad market no customers ever arrive). At each instant, the rms choose
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simultaneously whether to stay in the game or to take an irreversible exit decision.
The rms are able to react to other rmsexit decisions instantaneously (that is, if a
rm i exits at time t, another rm j is able to react to the bad news induced by is
exit and follow suit essentially at that same time moment, yet strictly after i). Note
that this is a property of the discrete time model in the limit t! 0.
Formalizing mixed strategies in continuous time is more subtle than in discrete
time, because a rm may either exit at some ow probability  such that the proba-
bility of exiting between t and t + dt is dt, or at a discrete probability  that gives
a strictly positive probability measure to the event of exit exactly at t. It will be
seen that in symmetric equilibrium all rms apply ow exit probabilities as long as
information arrives gradually, which is the case as long as no one exits. However, as
soon as a rm exits, a discrete amount of bad news is released, and this induces the
remaining rms to apply a discrete exit probability to release enough information to
keep each other indi¤erent between staying and exiting. A sequence of such discrete
randomizations continues either until enough good news has been released to move
the game back to the ow randomization mode, or until all rms have exited the
game. Hence, the equilibrium exhibits phases of inaction coupled with waves of exit.
Consider rst a monopoly rm experimenting in the market. The evolution of p
as long as no customers arrive is given by a continuous time counterpart to (1):
dp
dt
=  p (1  p) : (5)
Denote by V (p) the value function of a monopoly. Bellman function in the con-
tinuation region is:
rV (p) dt = pvdt+ E (dV (p))
= pvdt+ pdt

v
r
  V (p)

+ (1  pdt)V 0 (p)p (1  p) dt:
The optimal stopping threshold p can be solved using value matching, i.e. V (p) = c
r
and smooth pasting, i.e. V 0 (p) = 0 to yield:
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p =
rc
 (v (r + )  c) : (6)
Moving to the case of multiple rms, we start by some immediate observations.
First, since it is always possible to mimic the monopolist rm, it is never optimal to
exit at a belief above p, regardless of the number of rms in the market. Second,
there cannot be symmetric equilibria in pure strategies. To see why, suppose on the
contrary that all uninformed rms exit at probability one at some 0 < p  p in
the symmetric equilibrium. Since each rm has become informed with probability
p
 
1  e t > 0; any individual rm observes instantaneously that the market is
good with probability
p

1   e tN 1 > 0
by staying for dt in the market. The capital gain from staying for dt is hence
v   c
r

p

1   e tN 1 > cdt
as dt is small. On the other hand, pure strategy prole commanding every rm to
stay forever cannot be an equilibrium, because then observations regarding other rms
would be uninformative and any individual rm should employ the optimal strategy
of the monopolist.
Third, in any symmetric equilibrium, the rms must exit at a positive probability
at p = p. To see why, suppose on the contrary that all rms stay at probability one
until p falls to p0 < p. Then there is no observational learning for p 2 (p0;1] and by
the solution to the monopolists problem, we know that there is a protable deviation
to exit at all p 2 (p0; p].
Finally, the probability at which the rms exit at p = p must be interpreted
in the sense of ow exit probabilities. If, on the contrary, the rms exited with a
strictly positive instantaneous probability at p = p, then the posterior would jump
with a positive probability to a value strictly above p. In that case the capital
gain from staying for an additional dt would outweigh the cost of waiting cdt and
this would contradict the optimality of exit for an individual rm. On the other
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hand, the randomizations must be "strong" enough to prevent p from falling below
p if no rm exits, because otherwise the capital gain from staying could not cover
the cost of waiting. Therefore, the requirement for equilibrium randomizations is
that conditional on no rms exiting, the posterior of uninformed rms must remain
exactly at p. Let us denote by  (n; t) the equilibrium exit rate of each individual
rm at the threshold belief p, given the number of rms n, and time t that induces
conditional probability q (t)  1  e t with which a rm has seen a customer given
that the market is good. Using the Bayesrule, we get:
 (n; t) =

(n  1) (1  e t) : (7)
Notice that this implies that the total probability with which each rm i observes
another rm exiting is independent of the number of other rms in the market.
On the other hand, when a single rm exits, the posterior falls immediately to
level
p  (t) =
pe t
1  p (1  e t) : (8)
In order to complete the description of the symmetric equilibrium, we need to
specify the behavior of the rms at beliefs below p: At p < p; the rms must exit
with a discrete probability. If they didnt, then beliefs would stay below p with
probability 1 after an instant dt: By previous arguments, rms must exit with pos-
itive probability at all such p and hence the continuation payo¤ would be 0. Given
that there is the positive opportunity cost cdt from staying in the market, such a
strategy cannot be optimal. On the other hand, using the same argument as above,
symmetric equilibrium randomization require that for all possible outcomes in the
randomization, posterior beliefs stay below p: We must therefore construct an equi-
librium by requiring that the posterior rises exactly to p conditional on no exits in
the randomization.
Denote by  (n; p; t) the symmetric exit probability of the uninformed rms at
posterior p, when there are n rms left in the market. Firm i exits with probability
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 (n; p; t) if the market is bad. If the market is good, rm i has become informed
with probability 1   e t and exits with probability e t (n; p; t). Hence requiring
that the posterior be p conditional on no exits amounts to:
p
 
1  e t (n; p; q)n 1
p (1  e t (n; p; t))n 1 + (1  p) (1   (n; p; t))n 1 = p
:
Rewriting, we get
1  p
p
p
1  p =
(1   (n; p; t))n 1
(1  e t (n; p; t))n 1 ; (9)
and we can solve for the unique  (n; p; t) that satises this equation.
In order to analyze the equilibria as n grows, it is useful to take logarithms on the
two sides of (9) and use the approximation ln (1  x)   x for x small to get:
 (n; p; t) !
n!1
  ln

1 p
p
p
1 p

(n  1) (1  e t)   (n; p; t) : (10)
Note that the number of rms that actually exit follows a binomial distribution.
If the market is bad, the binomial parameters are  (n; p; t) and n, and if the market
is good, the parameters are e t (n; p; t) and n. According to (10),  (n; p; t)  n
converges to   ln

1 p
p
p
1 p

=
 
1  e t as n grows. This means that as n ! 1,
the distribution of the number of rms that exit approaches the Poisson distribu-
tion with parameter   ln

1 p
p
p
1 p

=
 
1  e t if the market is bad, and parameter
 e t ln

1 p
p
p
1 p

=
 
1  e t if the market is good.
We have now constructed informally a symmetric equilibrium in the continuous
time game. Its main features are: i) No rm exits at beliefs above the monopoly exit
level p: ii) At posterior p = p; uninformed rms exit at a ow rate that keeps the
beliefs of the uninformed unchanged as long as no other rm exits. iii) When a rm
exits, the posterior of the uninformed rms falls below p. This starts a sequence of
discrete exit randomizations - a wave of exit - such that at each round all uninformed
rms exit with a strictly positive probability such that the number of exiting rms
follows a Poisson distribution with a parameter that depends on the current level of
p. This exit wave consisting of many such rounds takes place within an innitely
short time interval and stops either when all rms have exited (we call this a market
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collapse), or when no rm exits at some round, which causes p to jump back to p
starting another phase of ow randomizations. Furthermore, iv) As N ! 1 the
probability that an individual rm exits when the market is good converges to 0. To
see why, note that the probability distribution of the number of exiting rms within
each round of an exit wave is independent of the total number of rms, as long as N
is large. Therefore, as N ! 1 , the proportion of those rms that actually need to
exit before the true market state is revealed to all rms reduces to zero.
It is useful to check that the equilibrium as described here corresponds to the
equilibrium in discrete time. To do this, let us now consider the properties of the
equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2 in the limit t! 0. As long as no rm is
exiting, the posterior of the uninformed rms falls according to the Bayesrule (1),
which converges to (5) as t ! 0. As the step size in the Bayesrule is continuous
in t; randomizations conditional on no exits take place at p close to p when t is
small. At the same time, conditional on no exit in any randomization, p +p ! p
as t ! 0, because the cost of staying in the market converges to zero. Hence
conditional on no exit, the posterior stays arbitrarily close to p and this is possible
in the limit only if all rms randomize at the continuous exit rates calculated in
(7). On the other hand, as soon as a rm exits, p falls substantially below p, and
equilibrium randomizations  (n; p; q) given in Lemma 1 converge to the solution of
(9) as t! 0. Therefore, what we have been describing in this section is indeed the
equilibrium of Proposition 2 in the limit t! 0.
At this stage, we can summarize our main economic ndings. In the symmetric
equilibrium that we constructed, the payo¤ of each individual rm is the same as it
would be in the absence of observational learning. Firms exit the market at a much
slower rate, however. In particular, when the number of rms is large, exit is slow
enough to allow for almost perfect learning of the true market state in the long run.
The cost of this learning is that rms stay in the market too long when the market
is bad. To see this explicitly, let us now compute the arrival rate of market collapse
in a large market conditional on the market being bad.
In a large bad market the exit waves arrive at rate lim
n!1
 (n; t) = 
(1 e t) . How-
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ever, not all exit waves lead to market collapse. Denote by pc (t) the probability that
an exit wave taking place at time t leads to market collapse, given that the market
is bad (in a good market, probability of market collapses vanishes as N !1). The
posterior belief at the beginning of the exit wave is p  (t) as given in (8). The exit
wave can only end at p jumping back to p, or at p going to zero in a market col-
lapse. The subjective probability of an uninformed rm for the former possibility as
calculated at the beginning of the exit wave is p  (t) + (1  p  (t)) (1  pc (t)), and
for the latter (1  p  (t)) pc (t). Since unconditional p is a martingale, the subjective
expected value of p after the exit wave must be p  (t). This martingale condition can
be written as:
p

p  (t) +
 
1  p  (t) (1  pc (t)) = p  (t) ;
which, after using (6) and (8), is easy to solve for pc (t):
pc (t) = 1  e t.
Therefore, the rate at which the market collapse arrives must be
 = lim
n!1
 (n; t)  pc (t) = ,
that is, in a bad large market the collapse arrives at the same rate as a customer
arrives to each rm in a good market. The intuition for this result is as follows. When
N is large, the probability that a given small rm exits before the true market state
has been (almost) fully revealed vanishes. However, we know that in a symmetric
equilibrium each rm has the same payo¤ as a monopoly rm, which means that an
uninformed rm must be kept indi¤erent between exiting and staying. This is only
possible when the arrival of the signal that fully reveals that the market is bad (market
collapse) arrives at the same rate as the signal that fully reveals that the market is
good (a customer). In essence, after p has dropped to p, an individual uninformed
rm in a large market sees the world as if waiting for a fully revealing signal that
arrives at rate : with probability p the contents of the signal is a customer that
pays a lump payment v and indicates that the market is good, and with probability
(1  p) this signal is a market collapse that indicates that the market is bad and
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pays nothing. As long as no signal arrives, p stays at p, and the rm is indi¤erent
between waiting and exiting.
Let us now contrast the symmetric equilibrium to the pure strategy equilibrium.
In continuous time, the pure strategy equilibrium is easy to describe. At time t,
the rms reveal their private history by exiting in sequence until either all rms have
exited, or until one rm reveals that the market is good by staying. Everything
takes place at time t, so the di¤erence to the symmetric equilibrium is that the true
state of the market is revealed faster. This explains why the payo¤s are greater than
in the symmetric equilibrium (except for the rst rm in sequence to exit). Even
if in a large market there is almost perfect learning in all equilibria (Theorem 1),
di¤erent equilibria di¤er from each other in how long the rms stay in a bad market.
The symmetric equilibrium is the worst in this sense, whereas the pure strategy
equilibrium is the best. However, even in this equilibrium the rms stay in a bad
market too long; information can never aggregate before t = t.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that information is aggregated in large markets with exit in the long
run sense. At the same time, we show that this does not imply that welfare of the
rms would be close to the welfare resulting from full information sharing. In fact, in
the symmetric equilibrium of the model, no rm benets from observing the others.
In asymmetric equilibria, some rmspayo¤s are above the monopoly level, but even
in large markets, welfare is always strictly below the payo¤s in the case where past
histories are publicly observed.
We have kept the model as simple as possible in order to highlight the mechanics
of information generation. There are a number of directions for extending the model.
In a market context it might be natural to assume that the rate of arrival of customers
at a given rm depends negatively on the number of rms in the market. The main
results in the paper would not change if the rate at which customers arrive is given
by  (n).
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Another possibility is to assume that the opportunity cost of staying in the market
is private information to each rm. In this setting, the game has a symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium and the model can address the issue of information aggrega-
tion about a common values variable in a setting with incomplete information about
private values components of uncertainty. Our initial results suggest that the limit
of this game as the heterogeneity of the rms is reduced towards zero corresponds
exactly to the symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium of the present paper. There-
fore, incomplete information concerning the rmscost parameters could be used as
a purication argument for our mixed strategy equilibrium. It may prove fruitful to
consider more general specications for the private benets of the market participants
in this setting.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. If a rm would get less than a monopoly in , then this
rm could deviate by ignoring the information obtained by observing the behavior of
the other rms, and replicate the behavior of a monopoly rm. Since the model has
no payo¤ externalities, this would guarantee the same payo¤ as a monopoly rm, and
thus for all active rms Vi (ht;)  Vm (pi (ht;)). In particular, a rm that would exit
at pi (ht; ) > p would have a lower payo¤ than a monopoly rm, thus in equilibrium
pi (h
t; ) > p implies that i (ht) = 0. To show that Vi (ht;) = Vm (pi (ht;)) for at
least one active rm, it su¢ ces to note that at any history, there must be some rm
that is the next to exit at a positive probability, and since this rm chooses to do
so without any further observations on the exit behavior of the other rms, this rm
can not have a better payo¤ than a monopoly rm.
Proof of Lemma 1. Dene a "one-step" continuation payo¤ function as the
value of a hypothetical rm that stays in the market one more period to observe the
actions of n   1 other rms, each of whom exits independently at probability  in
case of being uninformed and at probability 0 in case of being informed, but after this
specic period will ignore all observations about other rms, and instead will behave
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like a monopoly:
Cn (; p; q)   ct+ pvt+ 1
1 + rt
n
pt

(1 + rt) (v   c)
r

+(1  pt)
nX
k=0
P (X (; n  1; q) = k)  Vm (p+p)
o
; (11)
where Vm () is dened by (2), and P (X (; n  1; q) = k) and p + p are given
by (3) and (4), respectively.
Take any parameter values in the range  2 (0; 1), p 2 (0; 1), and q 2 (0; 1).
Clearly, Cn (; p; q) is continuous in all parameters and strictly increasing in p. Since
Vm () is convex and an increase in  induces a mean preserving spread in p+p, it
follows that Cn (; p; q) is also increasing in . In particular, Vm () is strictly convex
for p > p, and hence Cn (; p; q) is strictly increasing in  whenever a randomization
of the rms induces p to jump above p at a positive probability. This means that
Cn (; p; q) is strictly increasing in  at such parameter values that Cn (; p; q) = 0.
When  = 0, observation gives no information, and hence Cn (0; p; q) gives the
payo¤ of a monopoly rm that is constrained to stay for at least one more period.
Since at p = p a monopoly rm is indi¤erent between continuing and staying, we
must have Cn (0; p; q) = Vm (p) = 0. For any  2 (0; 1], we have Cn (; p; q) > 0. In
particular, Cn (1; p ; q) > 0, while on the other hand it follows by direct calculation
from (11) that Cn (1; 0; q) =  ct < 0. From the fact that Cn () is continuous and
strictly increasing in p, it immediately follows that there is a unique p (n; q) 2 (0; p)
such that Cn (1; p; q) = 0 for p = p (n; q). Since Cn () is strictly increasing in p and
increasing in , it follows that for p < p (n; q), Cn (; p; q) < 0 for any  2 [0; 1].
Thus, for p < p (n; q) it is optimal to exit irrespective of . On the other hand, from
the fact that Cn (; p; q) is everywhere continuous and increasing in , and strictly
increasing in  when Cn (; p; q) = 0, it follows that for any p 2
 
p (n; q) ; p

there
is a unique  (n; p; q) 2 (0; 1) such that Cn ( (n; p; q) ; p; q) = 0, meaning that the
rm is indi¤erent between staying and exiting. It also follows that Cn (; p; q) < (>) 0
for  < (>) (n; p; q), and hence it is strictly optimal to exit (stay). The fact that
it is optimal to stay irrespective of  for p  p follows trivially from the monopoly
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optimization problem.
The continuity and monotonicity properties of p (n; q) and  (n; p; q) can be es-
tablished by implicit di¤erentiation of the conditions Cn ( (n; p; q) ; p; q) = 0 and
Cn
 
1; p (n; q) ; q

= 0, respectively. The fact that p must jump above p when no rm
exits follows from the fact that in order to make the rm indi¤erent between stay-
ing one more period and continuing,  (n; p; q) must induce a positive probability of
moving p to a level that gives a strictly positive monopoly payo¤, that is, above p.
This must happen in particular if no rm exits, because this is the event that induces
the most optimistic belief to the rm.
Proof of proposition 2. Since in a symmetric equilibrium all rms must
have the same payo¤ after any history, it follows from Proposition 1 that Vi (ht;) =
Vm (pi (h
t;)) for all i 2 A (ht). This means that in checking whether a particular
prole is an equilibrium, it su¢ ces to consider the optimality of the current period
actions at all possible histories of the game by taking as given that the payo¤ in
the next period is the monopoly payo¤ Vm (pi (ht;)). It is then straight-forward
to see that in all histories, where the current belief of the uninformed rms is pt 2 
p (nt; qt) ; p

, the only symmetric action that leaves no possibility for a protable
deviation for any rm is the randomization with an exit probability that gives the
one-step continuation payo¤ equal to zero to all uninformed rms. Since each of the
nt active rms have access to the randomization of nt   1 other rms, the unique
exit probability that satises this requirement is According to Lemma 1  (nt; pt; qt).
Lemma 1 implies that for all histories where pt  p, it is the dominant strategy for
all rms to stay at probability one, and for all histories where pt  p (nt; qt), it is
the dominant strategy for all rms to exit at probability one. Thus, S as dened in
Proposition 2 is an equilibrium, and there can not be other symmetric equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3. Take a prole  that denes the behavior of the rms
as it is described in Proposition 3. Let the number of rms that reveal information
in  within each period t > t be given by a sequence fktgTt=t. Dene this sequence
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so that for t = t; t + 1; ::: :
kt  min
h
N   kt 1; minn 2 f1; 2; :::g Cn  1; pt; qt  0	i ; (12)
where k
t
= 0 for t = t and k
t
=
tX
t0=t
ktt=0 for t > t
. Function Cn () is the one-step
continuation payo¤function dened in the Proof of Lemma 1, qt = 1 (1  t)t, and
pt is the belief of an uninformed rm, who has observed the exit of k
t0
rms at periods
t0 = t; :::; t   1 (and thus learnt that those rms have not observed a customer).
Then, the sequence fktgTt=t dening the number of exiting rms within each period
is obtained by taking the strictly positive terms from the sequence fktg1t=t. It is clear
that condition (12) denes a unique sequence. Starting from t = t, kt is given by
the smallest positive integer such that Cn (1; pt; qt)  0, until this condition can not
be satised by an integer smaller than N   kt 1. When this happens, kt = N   kt 1
(meaning that all the remaining rms exit), and at all periods after this kt = 0.
The description of the equilibrium strategies is completed as follows. In each
period t; kt rms with the smallest indices amongst the active rms are the ones to
exit. If in any period t0 an exit by a rm that exits with probability zero in equilibrium
is observed, the strategies of the active rms remain exactly as on the equilibrium
path. In other words, the remaining rms assign no informational content to such
exits.7
To see that  is an equilibrium, note that kt is dened in (12) by taking the
smallest number of rms such that when those kt rms reveal their information, the
remaining rms have a positive one-step continuation payo¤. Thus, none of those
kt rms has an incentive to stay, because by deviating a rm would induce all the
remaining rms to stay forever, and therefore this deviating rm would never receive
any information from the remaining rms in the future. Hence, the appropriate payo¤
is given by the one-step payo¤ function, which in this case is negative as only kt   1
would reveal information to this deviating rm. On the other hand, (12) requires
7The full description of the equilibrium strategies is available from the authors upon request.
They are notationally cumbersome but otherwise straightforward and we have omitted displaying
them in order to save space.
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that a rm that does not belong to the group of those kt rms has a positive one-step
continuation payo¤. For these rms, the total payo¤ can be even higher than the
one-step payo¤, since they may get even more information from other rms in the
future. By deviating (and exiting) such a rm would only get a payo¤ equal to zero,
which obviously would not be optimal.
The equilibrium as described here is the only pure strategy equilibrium, because
it is always a dominant strategy for all rms to stay in periods t < t, and for all
t  t, any number ekt 6= kt representing the number of exiting rms would allow a
protable deviation. If ekt were greater than kt, any of the exiting rms would gain by
staying, and if ekt were smaller than kt, any of the staying rms would gain by exiting.
Finally, note that the uniqueness is up to a permutation of the rms, because we
have not xed the order in which the rms exit. Any permutation is an equilibrium,
as long as it allocates kt rms to exit at period t.
Proof of Proposition 4. When 4t ! 0, the cost of waiting one more period
approaches zero. Therefore, for a rm with an arbitrary belief p > 0, there must be
an  (p) such that when 4t <  (p), it is optimal for this rm to wait one more period
if waiting fully reveals the information of another rm. Fix an arbitrary period lengthf4t and take the lowest belief that an uninformed rm can ever have before all rms
have exited when the rms reveal their information one at the time in succeeding
periods t, t + 1, ... . Denote this lowest belief by p  and take  (p ). When 4t <
min

 (p ) ;f4t, observing the behavior of one rm is enough to keep the remaining
rms better o¤ than exiting, meaning that C1 (1; pt; qt) > 0 for all remaining rms
at all pt and qt that are reached when rms exit one at a time in succeeding periods.
Then condition (12) denes kt = 1 for all t = t; t + 1; :::; t +N   1.
Proof of proposition 5. Consider the problem of choosing strategies  =
(1; :::; n) to
max

nX
i=1
Vi (h;)
s.t. imaxf0; pi (h)  pg = 0:
In other words, player i can be chosen to exit with positive probability only if her
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posterior on g is at or below p: Since all Nash equilibria of the game satisfy the
constraint, the claim is proved if we show that the pure strategy equilibrium solves
the problem.
It is easy to see that the pure strategy equilibrium maximizes the sum of payo¤s.
The principle of unimprovability states that a path is optimal if there is no protable
one-step deviation to it. Given the denition of the pure strategy equilibrium, it is
clear that it is not optimal for a rm to stay when it should exit (following rms stay
in the market when they should not). Also, it is never optimal for a rm to exit when
it should stay as the other rmscontinuation strategies are una¤ected by such exits
and it is privately optimal for the rm to stay.
Proof of Theorem 1. We want to show that for any " and , 9 t > 0 and
N > 0 such that
Pg

X (t; N)
N
 "

< :
whenever t < t and N > N .
We start by various denitions. First, denote by P g () the probability of a given
event conditional that the market is good when the players adopt strategy . Next,
consider an outside observer who starts with the initial belief p0 and observes the
behavior of all the rms, but receives no signals of her own. We denote by p0 (ht;)
the posterior belief of such an outside observer that has observed a history ht and
knows that the rms play according to . Finally, given , dene for each history ht
a randomization history rt as a list containing the data of the actual randomization
probabilities used by all rms so far, given that they are uninformed. Formally, any
pair (; ht) induces a randomization history rt as follows:
rt =

1
 
h0

; :::; N
 
h0

; :::;

1
 
ht

; :::; N
 
ht
	
;
where h  ht is the truncation of history ht up to  < t. Let us denote by
R the set of all possible randomization histories, and by R the set of all possible
randomization histories that  may induce at a positive probability. Note that in this
denition, we have actually extended the denition of strategies so that they dene
exit probabilities also for the rms that have already exited. More precisely, if rm i
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has exited during history ht, we dene the probability of exit for this rm to be zero,
i.e. i (ht) = 0 for i =2 A (ht).
Note that a randomization history rt is nothing but a series of independent
Bernoulli trials, and hence every rt induces a probability that a given history ht
occurs. Hence, we write P r
t
g (A) to refer to the probability that some h
t  A occurs
as a result of randomization history rt (note that this probability has nothing to do
with ). Since every ht maps to a single rt (given ), it must hold that for any A  H:
P g (A)  max
rt2R
P r
t
g (A) : (13)
Let us now begin the actual proof by xing any " > 0 and  > 0. Denote by AN;t"
the set of such histories ht where the number of rms that have exited exceeds "N at
period t:
AN;t" 

ht 2 H n  ht < N (1  ") ^ n  htnat 1  N (1  ")	 :
Let BN;t; be the set of histories ht such that the belief of the outside observer
is below p after history ht:
BN;t; =

ht 2 H p0  ht; < p	 :
Take any equilibrium . Consider the possibility that after some period during
which at least one rm exits, the belief of the outside observer is at or above p, that
is, p0 (ht;)  p for some ht for which n (ht) > n (htnat 1). This means that p0 (ht;)
would have been above p by a xed margin if no rm had exited, and therefore ex
ante there was a positive probability that the belief of the outside observer would be
strictly above p after that period. Since at the end of any period the outside observer
has exactly the same information as those rms who did exit would have if they had
stayed, it must be that any of those rms who actually did exit, faced a positive
ex-ante probability that their own belief would be above p after this period, had
they not exited. Since the cost of waiting one more period to observe the behavior
of the other rms vanishes as t ! 0, their exit decision would not be consistent
with equilibrium behavior if the period length is short enough. Hence, there must be
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some threshold level t such that whenever t < t, it must hold in any equilibrium
that p0 (ht;) < p whenever n (ht) > n (htnat 1). This means that AN;t"  BN;t;
whenever t < t. Therefore, if  is an equilibrium and t < t, we have:
P g
 
AN;t"

= P g
 
AN;t" \BN;t;

:
Using (13), we may now write:
P g
 
AN;t" \BN;t;
  max
rt2R
P r
t
g
 
AN;t" \BN;t;

Whenever a rm randomizes, there is a strictly positive probability that she is in
fact informed (givenM = g). Hence, if on a rt a given randomization leads to an exit
at a high probability, it must also lead to a release of positive information at a high
probability. It is then clear that for any rt 2 Rt, there must be some NA (rt) such
that

Prt
 
AN;t"

> 
	
=) Prt  BN;t;  < 	 wheneverN > NA (rt). On the other
hand, there must be a NB (rt) such that

Prt
 
BN;t;

> 
	
=) Prt  AN;t"  < 	
whenever N > NB (rt). Thus, whenever N > max (NA (rt) ; NB (rt)), we must have
min

Prt
 
AN;t"

; Prt
 
BN;t;

< , which means that Prt
 
AN;t" \BN;t;

< .
Dene N = max
rt2Rt
[max (NA (r
t) ; NB (r
t))]. Then, we have
P g
 
AN;t"
  max
rt2Rt
Prt
 
AN;t" \BN;t;

< 
whenever t < t and N > N . Since P g
 
AN;t"

= Pg

X(t;N)
N
 "

, this
completes the proof.
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